Iran launched ~20-30 ballistic missiles at Israel on June 7 evening — the first direct attack since the April 8 ceasefire. Israel struck back with multi-wave air strikes on targets in Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, and the Mahshahr petrochemical complex in Khuzestan Province. Both sides are calling it a single-cycle exchange. Neither has stopped.

The Trigger

Hezbollah fired at northern Israel on June 7, violating its own ceasefire commitments. The IDF responded by striking Dahiyeh, killing Hussain Makled, Hezbollah’s intelligence chief — violating Israel’s commitment not to target Beirut’s southern suburbs. Both violations on the same day ended the Lebanon ceasefire as a functioning instrument. Iran’s IRGC used the Makled killing as the pretext to launch.

The timing is telling. Pakistan’s Interior Minister Naqvi was in Tehran delivering Field Marshal Munir’s letter when Iran’s missiles were in flight. He handed the letter to FM Araghchi; no confirmation that Khamenei received it. Iran launching while its own mediation channel was active signals either that Khamenei authorized the strike knowing the Pakistani channel was live, or that IRGC hardliners acted faster than the diplomatic track could contain. Both readings make the mediation premise harder to sustain.

What Makled’s Death Changes

Hussain Makled served as the principal intelligence liaison between Tehran and Hezbollah’s operational units across Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. His death disrupts the IRGC-Hezbollah coordination chain immediately. Rebuilding that function takes weeks. For Iran, the operational calculus has shifted: it lost a key proxy coordinator at the moment it most needs cross-theater flexibility.

Tactically, the Iranian salvo was not a maximum-effort strike. Western intelligence assessments put Iran’s remaining serviceable ballistic missile inventory at 1,500 to 2,500 rounds after 100 days of CENTCOM strikes on launch infrastructure. Tehran fired ~20-30 — enough to demonstrate capability and impose interception costs, not enough to saturate Israeli air defenses. Restraint in scale matters as much as the decision to launch.

Oil: Approaching the Threshold

Brent opened June 8 at ~$96-97, up 3-5% from Friday’s $93 close. The 5% single-session threshold — above which systematic momentum buying activates — sits at ~$97.65. As of this writing, Brent is 65-165 cents below it. A second Iranian missile wave tonight likely pushes through.

Physical reality is tighter than the price suggests. Six consecutive US crude inventory draws at ~6.8M bbl/week have consumed ~40M bbl in six weeks. Saudi Arabia’s strategic reserve draw capacity is ~40 days from exhaustion at current pace. OPEC+‘s July announcement of another +188K bpd increase is effectively zero in market terms: Gulf producer volumes remain landlocked behind Hormuz. Supply emergency timeline: mid-July, if no Hormuz deal.

The Chokepoint the Market Has Not Priced

Bab el-Mandeb activation probability stands at 38-44%, up from 28-32% yesterday. The Lebanon ceasefire collapse was the specific trigger scenario flagged in prior analysis. Houthis are issuing explicit threats. MARAD 2026-006 remains active.

If the Houthis activate, Cape routing for Asia-bound cargoes faces 12-15 additional transit days. Total Cape routing demand would rise from ~8M to ~13-14M bbl/day. With 600+ vessels trapped in the Gulf, spare tonnage to absorb that surge does not exist. VLCC day rates at ~$137K/day (Baltic Exchange Cape route) reach $180-210K within 2-3 weeks of activation. Dual closure — both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb simultaneously — is not priced into the current Brent range.

The Architecture Problem

Every deal framework since April has treated Lebanon and the Iran-US MOU as linked but separable tracks. They are not separable in practice. The Lebanon ceasefire collapse means any revived text exchange has to rebuild the Lebanon component from scratch — a 2-4 week process at minimum, assuming a ceasefire re-emerges at all.

MOU probability stands at 1-3% (down from 3-5%). Stalemate under active fire: 60-65%. Full war resumption risk: 15-20%. None of these numbers should be read as stable. The next 24 hours — specifically whether Iran fires a third wave and whether Trump’s Netanyahu call produces actual operational restraint, not just social media demands — determines which direction they move.

Brent is the instrument to watch. Anything above $98 is the market beginning to price dual-chokepoint risk. Markets have been wrong about that risk before.