Country Brief: Iran

Current Status (Day 127 Update, 2026-07-04)

The conflict-phase narrative below (Day 103, June strike cycles) is historical background. Since then: the June 27-28 Bahrain/Kuwait strikes were absorbed rather than escalated, both sides entered a mutual stand-down June 29, and diplomacy shifted from Burgenstock to Doha. The Doha technical track (Qatari/Pakistani-mediated) has since gone into a scheduled pause through roughly July 9, tied to state funeral proceedings for the Supreme Leader running through Tehran, Qom, Najaf/Karbala, and burial at the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad; mediators describe it as a calendar pause, not a breakdown, and say the next round will be set “at the earliest possible time” after. Separately, Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi rejected a French-Omani offer to help clear the roughly 80 mines still in the central channel, insisting clearance “will be done solely by Iran and by no other country,” a position held since France and Oman first raised it in late June. The IRGC has authorized no clearance work of any kind, including its own. The UK and France separately reaffirmed their Multinational Military Mission with new Omani access to territorial waters; Iran’s foreign ministry called the strait “not a military parade ground for extra-regional powers.” Deal collapse probability: 35-45%, unchanged for several weeks. See today’s daily brief and the Ghalibaf variable for full detail.

Energy Profile

Metric	Value
Crude oil production (pre-crisis)	~3.2M bbl/day (2025 avg; sanctions-constrained)
OPEC quota	Exempt from OPEC+ cuts (under sanctions)
Crude oil exports (pre-crisis)	~1.5-1.8M bbl/day (mostly to China, via ship-to-ship transfers)
Proven reserves	~208.6B barrels (3rd largest globally)
Natural gas reserves	~1,203 Tcf (2nd largest globally; South Pars shared with Qatar)
Refining capacity	~2.4M bbl/day (domestic consumption priority)
Oil revenue share of GDP	~40-50% of government revenue (varies with sanctions enforcement)
Hormuz dependency	90%+ of oil exports transit Hormuz (Kharg Island terminal)

Key Infrastructure

• Kharg Island Terminal: Handles ~90% of Iran’s crude exports; capacity ~7M bbl/day; located ~25 km offshore in northern Persian Gulf. Still non-operational at Day 103; military targets struck twice during the air campaign (latterly Apr 7). Fortified with MANPADs, anti-personnel/anti-armor mines, and booby traps. The threatened US ground seizure was never executed; the air campaign (Operation Epic Fury) formally concluded May 5 and the 82nd Airborne/Marine seizure option was shelved as diplomacy took over.
• South Pars Gas Field: World’s largest gas field (shared with Qatar’s North Field); ~18 Bcf/day total extraction; primary source of domestic gas and condensate. South Pars petrochemical complex at Asaluyeh struck by Israel (Apr 6): Jam + Damavand facilities hit; Defense Minister Katz claimed 85% of petrochemical exports rendered inoperative; Iran disputes, says support utilities hit, not main complex. Recovery timeline now a key sanctions-waiver question, since restored petrochemical exports are a hard-currency lifeline if waivers materialize under the MoU.
• Bandar Abbas Refinery: 350K bbl/day; located at Hormuz narrows
• Isfahan Refinery: 375K bbl/day (combined with Arak); central Iran; less exposed to strikes
• Abadan Refinery: 500K bbl/day (Iran’s largest refinery; expanded from historical 400K nameplate)
• Jask Oil Terminal (under development): Bypass terminal on Gulf of Oman coast; designed to export 1M bbl/day outside Hormuz; pipeline from Goreh partially complete. Still not a functioning bypass; with the strait choked, Iran has no operational route to move crude outside Hormuz.
• IRGC Naval Bases: Bandar Abbas, Abu Musa Island, Sirri Island, Larak Island; positioned to control Hormuz approaches with significant drone and fast-boat staging capacity. Bandar Abbas remained a flashpoint during the truce: US strikes hit mine-laying boats and missile sites there on May 25. CENTCOM’s June 3-9 strikes then worked through the IRGC Hormuz interdiction kill chain in sequence: Qeshm Island C2 (June 3), Goruk coastal radar (June 5-6), and ~20 targets (air defenses, radar sites, ground control stations near Hormuz) on June 9. Sensors and C2 were hit, not shooters or stockpiles; IRGC maritime domain awareness at the strait is degraded.

Key Actors

• Supreme Leader (SUCCESSION NOW FORMAL, STATE FUNERAL UNDERWAY): Ali Khamenei was assassinated Feb 28; Mojtaba Khamenei was reported elected as successor Mar 8, though the succession process was described in some reporting as “unclear” for months afterward. As of this update, state funeral proceedings for the Supreme Leader are underway (Tehran lying-in-state and ceremonies July 3-5, procession to Qom July 6, transfer to Najaf/Karbala in Iraq July 8, burial at the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad July 9), finally formalizing a closure to the succession question the SITREP has tracked as opaque since the spring. The Doha diplomatic track has paused for the duration. Whether the new Supreme Leader’s authority over the IRGC differs materially from the disrupted, opaque command picture described below remains the open question once the funeral period concludes and any post-succession statement on Hormuz policy is issued.
• President Masoud Pezeshkian: Remains president; the civilian face of the regime through the war and the ceasefire-to-MoU diplomacy. Promoted the “Janfada” civil-defense mobilization during the air campaign.
• Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf: Parliament speaker; part of the Iranian delegation (with Araghchi) at the failed Islamabad talks Apr 11-12; a hardline anchor pushing the NPT-withdrawal track. Now the lead Iranian voice at the Doha technical talks (alongside FM spokesman Baghaei), where he has called the Strait of Hormuz “Iran’s greatest instrument of power,” rejected US attempts to “internationalize” its governance, and set release of the ~$6B in Iranian funds frozen in Qatar as Tehran’s precondition for elevating talks to principal level.
• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): Commands asymmetric naval forces (kamikaze drones, fast attack boats, naval mines); estimated 150K+ active personnel. Drove the May 7 strikes on US vessels off Chabahar, the late-May ballistic-missile launches at Kuwait, and the June 3/6/10 counterstrike cycles: 25+ ballistic missiles and dozens of drones fired at defended US facilities across the arc, with zero confirmed casualties and zero confirmed facility damage. The pattern is demonstrative, aimed at host-nation basing politics rather than attrition. Its June 6 tripwire is on record: further US strikes on Iranian territory mean a move to “completely close” Hormuz. That makes the IRGC both the principal spoiler risk to any deal and the holder of the live closure trigger.
• IRGC Navy (IRGCN): Distinct from regular Iranian Navy (IRIN); controlled Hormuz enforcement; operated ~1,500 fast boats, drone fleet, and shore-based anti-ship missiles. Commander Tangsiri + intelligence head Rezaei killed (Mar 26); BM chief Atimi killed (Apr 2). Yazd naval arms/mine factory struck (Mar 28). It retains the mine-laying capability central to keeping the strait choked; the MoU’s 30-day mine-clearance clause would require this force to undo its own primary leverage. CENTCOM’s June 3-9 strikes (Qeshm C2, Goruk radar, ~20 targets June 9) sequentially degraded its Hormuz interdiction kill chain and maritime domain awareness; the sensors that cue its shore-based anti-ship batteries are damaged, the shooters largely are not.
• IRGC Aerospace Force: Ballistic missile and drone production; ~2/3 of manufacturing capacity destroyed during the campaign (Adm. Cooper, Mar 25). Demonstrated residual reach in late May with ballistic missiles fired at Kuwait, then through the June 3/6/10 cycles. The June 10 counterstrike put ballistic missiles on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan (all 5 intercepted), the first Iranian strike on Jordanian territory, extending threat geography ~1,200 km west of prior aim points. A Shahed one-way attack drone downed a US Army AH-64 Apache over Hormuz June 9, the first US aircraft lost to Iranian fire in the crisis (“shot down” framing is Trump’s; one account suggests a possible midair collision, and deliberate intent is unconfirmed). 357 BMs, 1,815 drones, 15 cruise missiles intercepted by UAE alone since Feb 28.
• NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company): State oil company; manages Kharg Island and upstream operations. Its export volumes are the real-world test of any US sanctions waiver under the MoU.
• Foreign Minister Araghchi: Lead negotiator. Declared Hormuz “open to all shipping” Apr 17 (oil fell ~11% on the statement, though practical transits stayed near zero). Led Iran’s team at the failed Islamabad talks (Apr 11-12) and the “generally positive” Doha track in late May. Now owns two doctrinal statements that frame the June arc: the Iran-Israel conditional halt tripwire (any IDF strike on Dahiyeh terminates it and Iranian forces respond) and the June 10 host-nation liability line that regional states bear “legal and moral responsibility” to prevent US/Israeli strikes from their territory, putting any state hosting US strike-capable forces in the target set. He is rhetorically coupling US strikes to “the ceasefire” while Tehran keeps the US and Israel tracks operationally separate.
• Supreme National Security Council (SNSC): Reconstituted after the killing of secretary Ali Larijani (Mar 17, with Basij commander Gholamreza Soleimani); accepted the original ceasefire and nominally owns the MoU decision, though the June 10 counterstrike profile raises the question of whether launch decisions are running through it at all.
• Intelligence Ministry: Reportedly maintained quiet backchannel contact with the US through the war; those channels feed the current Doha/MoU diplomacy.
• Proxy networks: Houthis (Yemen), Hezbollah (Lebanon), Kataib Hezbollah and PMF factions (Iraq). The June 1 Lebanon ceasefire collapsed June 7-8 and IDF operations continue. The Houthis re-entered the conflict June 8 (missile at Tel Aviv, declared Red Sea ban on Israeli shipping, three vessels struck), making Bab el-Mandeb an active second chokepoint (full closure assessed 65-75%).

IRGC Drone & Asymmetric Inventory (Estimates)

• Shahed-136/238 kamikaze drones: Hundreds to low thousands believed available pre-crisis; primary Hormuz enforcement weapon; cheap ($20-50K per unit), GPS/INS guided, difficult to intercept at scale
• Mohajer/Ababil ISR drones: Surveillance and targeting; some weaponized variants
• Fast attack craft: ~1,500 small boats (IRGC Navy); swarm tactics doctrine
• Naval mines: Estimated stockpile of 3,000-6,000 mines; the mines laid in Hormuz are now the single biggest physical obstacle to reopening. 44 minelayers destroyed but mine inventory largely intact; MCM clearance ~30% reliable. The MoU asks Iran to clear its own mines within 30 days; even with a signature, DHL estimates 4-6 months to normalize traffic. Yazd mine factory struck (Mar 28): production capability damaged but existing stockpile unaffected. The US struck boats “attempting to emplace mines” at Bandar Abbas on May 25, suggesting Iran was still mining during the truce.
• Anti-ship missiles: Noor (C-802 variant), Ghader, Khalij Fars anti-ship ballistic missile; shore-based along Hormuz coast.
• Note (Day 103): The air campaign concluded May 5. Over its course CENTCOM reported ~2/3 of missile, drone, and naval production destroyed, ~92% of the largest navy vessels sunk, 13,000+ targets struck, and 10,000+ combat flights; Iran’s regenerative potential is gutted for 12-24+ months. Existing inventory still proved sufficient for sustained asymmetric operations during the truce: strikes on US vessels off Chabahar (May 7), ballistic missiles at Kuwait (late May), and the June 3/6/10 counterstrike cycles (25+ ballistic missiles and dozens of drones, plus the Shahed that downed a US Apache over Hormuz June 9). IRGC command was hollowed out by the killings of Tangsiri + Rezaei (Mar 26) and Atimi (Apr 2) during the war. A signed MoU would freeze further degradation but does not restore lost capability.

Crisis Exposure (Day 103 - Strike Cycles)

• JUNE 3-10 US-IRAN STRIKE CYCLES, THE MOST SERIOUS SINCE APRIL 13: Three IRGC counterstrike cycles (June 3, 6, 10) put 25+ ballistic missiles and dozens of drones onto defended US facilities across the arc, with zero confirmed casualties and zero confirmed facility damage. The June 10 cycle hit three host nations at once: drones at 5th Fleet HQ Bahrain and Ali Al Salem (Kuwait), ballistic missiles at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, the first Iranian strike on Jordanian territory (all 5 intercepted). It answered CENTCOM’s ~20-target June 9 package. Iran’s claim of hits on 21 facilities including F-35 hangars is denied by host nations and assessed propaganda. CENTCOM’s June 3-9 strikes (Qeshm C2 June 3, Goruk radar June 5-6, ~20 targets June 9: air defenses, radars, ground control stations) sequentially degraded the IRGC Hormuz interdiction kill chain.
• APACHE DOWNED OVER HORMUZ (JUNE 9): An Iranian Shahed one-way attack drone downed a US Army AH-64 over the strait, the first US aircraft lost to Iranian fire in this crisis; both pilots rescued uninjured. Attribute the “shot down” framing to Trump; one account suggests a possible midair collision. The ~20-target CENTCOM package followed within hours, then CENTCOM declared operations complete.
• IRGC HORMUZ TRIPWIRE ON RECORD (JUNE 6): Further US strikes on Iranian territory mean a move to “completely close” Hormuz. A second US strike night now produces a closure decision point, not another symmetrical cycle.
• IRAN-ISRAEL CONDITIONAL HALT (JUNE 8), HOLDING: After the June 7-8 direct ballistic-missile exchange (the first since the Apr 8 ceasefire, triggered by the IDF Dahiyeh strike that killed Hezbollah intelligence chief Makled), both sides halted; the halt has held through June 10. Araghchi’s tripwire: any IDF strike on Dahiyeh terminates it. Iran rhetorically couples US strikes to “the ceasefire” while keeping the two tracks operationally separate.
• INDEFINITE CEASEFIRE, FRAGILE (since Apr 21): Trump extended the original two-week Pakistan-brokered truce indefinitely on Apr 21 while keeping the naval blockade and military readiness in place. It has been repeatedly violated: US strikes Apr 19, May 7, and May 25, late-May “defensive strikes” in southern Iran answered by Iranian ballistic missiles on Kuwait, and now the June 3-10 cycles. The air campaign (Operation Epic Fury) formally concluded May 5.
• 60-DAY MoU TENTATIVELY REACHED (May 28), UNSIGNED: Reported terms: a 60-day ceasefire extension during which Hormuz reopens with NO tolls and Iran clears the mines it laid (within 30 days); in exchange the US lifts its port blockade (in proportion to restored traffic) and issues sanctions waivers letting Iran sell oil; Iran commits to forgo nuclear weapons and to negotiate HEU disposal plus an enrichment suspension. Trump bolted on new demands (Hormuz, no enrichment, unfreezing Iranian assets) May 29-30 that landed badly in Tehran; Iranian state media says it is not finalized on Iran’s end either. Doha talks were described as “generally positive.”
• DUAL BLOCKADE PERSISTS: The US imposed a naval blockade of Iranian ports on Apr 13 after the Islamabad talks failed, on top of Iran’s choke on the Gulf. Project Freedom (US Navy escort for merchant ships leaving the Gulf) launched May 4 and paused May 6, after which open transits fell to near zero.
• Hormuz open on paper, choked in practice: Araghchi declared the strait “open to all shipping” Apr 17 (oil fell ~11%), but IMF PortWatch counted 2 transits on June 7, 2% of the 94/day pre-crisis baseline. Mines are uncleared, VLCC war risk is running ~8x pre-crisis ($10-14M war-risk cost per Hormuz voyage per Lloyd’s List), P&I cover is not restored, and DHL estimates 4-6 months to normalize traffic even after a signature.
• Stranded shipping: ~20,000 mariners and ~2,000 ships stranded as of Apr 21; by mid-May, ~600 tankers stuck inside the Gulf and ~240 waiting outside. ~15,000 cruise passengers (6 ships) were evacuated ~Apr 18.
• Escalations during the truce: US seized the Iran-flagged cargo ship Touska in the Gulf of Oman via the 31st MEU (Apr 19), which Iran called a ceasefire violation. May 7: US struck ships at Hormuz plus Hormozgan-province sites; Iran hit US vessels east of the strait and off Chabahar. May 25: US struck missile sites and mine-laying boats at Bandar Abbas; Iran threatened retaliation. Late May: US “defensive strikes” in southern Iran answered by Iranian ballistic missiles at Kuwait.
• South Pars petrochemical complex struck (Apr 6): Israel hit Jam + Damavand facilities at Asaluyeh; Katz claimed 85% of petrochemical exports offline; Iran disputes. Recovery depends on whether sanctions waivers restore export markets.
• Nuclear track stalled: Negotiations stalled; Iran refused IAEA inspections of war-damaged facilities. The parliamentary NPT-withdrawal track continues even as the MoU floats nuclear commitments.
• Death toll (Day 103): Iran ~3,468-6,000+ killed and ~15,000-26,500 wounded (range reflects competing trackers and access constraints). 93,000+ civilian structures damaged/destroyed (Red Crescent).
• Oil: Brent ~$91/bbl (June 9 close $91.11), down from the ~$115 WTI peak on Apr 7; the market did not price the June 9-10 US-Iran exchange, treating it as a completed cycle. China crude imports at ~7.8M bbl/day, the lowest in 8+ years, are pressuring Iran’s main customer relationship from the demand side.

Diplomatic Position (Day 103 - MoU Stalled at 3-5%)

• MoU stalled, probability 3-5%: The 60-day extension MoU tentatively reached May 28 remains unsigned and has gone backward through the June strike cycles. Trump has now issued five timeline signals in four weeks (“largely negotiated” May 23, tentative MoU May 28, “this weekend” June 4, “over the next week” June 6, and on June 9 a peace deal within “two or three days” with “total victory” in two weeks); the prior four all missed, and each miss strengthens hardliners in Tehran arguing the US is negotiating in bad faith. Assessed probabilities: MoU 3-5%, extended stalemate 52-58%, full US-Iran war resumption 18-24% (up from 12-13% after the June 9-10 cycle).
• Treasury asset redirection (June 7) removed Iran’s main financial incentive: Treasury directed ~$24B in frozen Iranian assets to Gulf partners (Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia) for war-damage reconstruction. Iran’s central financial demand since April has been the unfreezing and return of these assets; the move inverts it, deploying the money under US control for Gulf benefit and stripping out the largest financial reason for Tehran to sign.
• MoU terms (reported): Hormuz reopens with no tolls; Iran clears its mines within 30 days; the US lifts its port blockade in proportion to restored traffic and issues sanctions waivers; Iran commits to forgo nuclear weapons and to negotiate HEU disposal plus an enrichment suspension. Sticking points are sanctions relief and asset-unfreezing in exchange for reopening, plus the nuclear commitments.
• Trump’s late additions (May 29-30): New demands on Hormuz, zero enrichment, and unfreezing Iranian assets landed badly in Tehran; the US defense secretary warned the military is ready to resume combat. Iranian state media says the deal is not finalized on Iran’s side.
• Failed Islamabad talks (Apr 11-12): US (Vance, Witkoff, Kushner) met Iran (Araghchi, Ghalibaf) for ~21 hours; Vance announced no agreement. The US then imposed the port blockade Apr 13. The current track runs through Doha, described as “generally positive.”
• Framing: Iran continues to present the war’s end as a US failure to break its asymmetric leverage; Trump frames the looming deal as reopening Hormuz on US terms. Both narratives serve domestic politics and complicate a clean signature.
• Mediators - Pakistan channel active but unanswered: Pakistan brokered the original ceasefire and is again the most direct channel: Interior Minister Naqvi delivered TWO letters in Tehran June 7, one from PM Shehbaz Sharif and one from Field Marshal Munir, described as delivered for Khamenei. Three days on there is no acknowledgment or response, consistent with the broader question of whether anything is reaching the Supreme Leader at all. Egypt, Turkey, Oman, and Qatar (Doha venue) remain in the channel.
• Lebanon: The June 1 ceasefire collapsed June 7-8 (Hezbollah fired at northern Israel; the IDF struck Dahiyeh and killed Hezbollah intelligence chief Makled). IDF operations continue, and Defense Minister Katz says they will; Araghchi’s Dahiyeh tripwire makes this track the most likely detonator for the Iran-Israel halt.
• NPT withdrawal track continues: The parliamentary push to exit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty advances in parallel with the MoU’s nuclear language, a contradiction the deal would have to resolve.

Structural Vulnerabilities (Day 103 - Strike Cycles)

• Cycle containment is the central risk: Every June cycle has been contained by a zero-casualty firebreak: Iran’s strikes have produced no confirmed US casualties, and the US has confined targeting to sensors and C2. Any Iranian strike that produces casualties removes the firebreak; the IRGC’s on-record June 6 tripwire means a second US strike night opens a Hormuz-closure decision point rather than another symmetrical cycle. Full war resumption assessed at 18-24%, stalemate 52-58%, MoU 3-5%.
• Mines are the binding physical constraint: The 3,000-6,000 mine stockpile is largely intact; MCM technology is ~30% reliable; the strait cannot fully reopen without weeks to months of clearance even if Iran cooperates. The MoU’s 30-day self-clearance clause is ambitious, and the May 25 Bandar Abbas strike on mine-laying boats suggests Iran was still mining during the truce.
• Sanctions-waiver credibility: Iran’s incentive to clear mines hinges on the US actually delivering port-blockade relief and waivers that let NIOC sell oil. Sequencing (Iran clears first vs. US lifts first) and proportionality are unresolved, and Iran has been burned before by reversible US relief.
• IAEA access: Iran has refused inspections of war-damaged nuclear sites, so the MoU’s nuclear commitments (no weapons, negotiate enrichment suspension, HEU disposal) lack a verification mechanism, undercutting any deal’s durability with Israel and Congress.
• Leadership opacity and assessed autonomous launch authority: Khamenei has not been confirmed in public since Feb 28; only written statements since March; his communications with the IRGC are reportedly disrupted since June 8 (single-source, unverified). The June 10 counterstrike profile fits pre-delegated IRGC launch authority (assessed, not confirmed). If true, US deterrent signaling may not reach the launch decision node, each US strike on Iranian territory auto-generates a counterstrike regardless of diplomatic state, and no authority can credibly bind Iran to a deal. The IRGC, SNSC, and clerical factions each still hold a spoiler veto.
• Degraded but not disarmed: ~2/3 of missile, drone, and naval production destroyed; ~92% of the largest navy vessels sunk; regenerative potential gutted for 12-24+ months. CENTCOM’s June 3-9 strikes added the Hormuz interdiction kill chain: Qeshm C2, Goruk radar, and ~20 sensor/C2 targets June 9, degrading IRGC maritime domain awareness. Yet existing stockpiles of mines, drones, missiles, and fast boats remain sufficient for asymmetric enforcement and retaliation, as the June 3/6/10 cycles and the June 9 Apache downing showed.
• Customer concentration under demand pressure: China takes most of Iran’s (currently halted) exports, and Chinese crude imports have fallen to ~7.8M bbl/day, the lowest in 8+ years. Even a reopening-plus-waivers outcome would return Iran to a buyer with shrinking appetite and stronger bargaining leverage on discounts.
• South Pars petrochemical damage: If Katz’s 85% claim holds, a major hard-currency earner is crippled just as Iran needs export revenue; recovery depends on both physical repair and sanctions-waiver market access. Iran disputes the damage scope.
• No Hormuz bypass: The Jask terminal on the Gulf of Oman remains non-functional, so Iran has no route to move crude outside the choked strait.
• Economy and society: Oil revenue effectively near zero through the closure; fiscal reserves thin; 93,000+ civilian structures destroyed; a prolonged internet blackout cut the population off from outside information during the war.

TankerBrief Coverage Angle

Defense analysts, intelligence community, sanctions experts, Gulf-based security firms, and tanker operators assessing Hormuz transit risk through the June strike cycles. They need: cycle-containment tracking (does Washington absorb the June 10 counterstrike, and does any Iranian strike produce casualties?), the IRGC Hormuz-closure tripwire as the binding escalation constraint, host-nation basing politics after the Jordan strike (watch Amman and Kuwait City for basing/overflight restrictions), Khamenei communications status and the autonomous-launch-authority hypothesis (who can stop the next cycle?), mine-clearance tracking (the 30-day clause vs. ~30% MCM reliability and a 4-6 month normalization estimate), sanctions-waiver credibility after the $24B asset redirection, IAEA access and the NPT-withdrawal track as the nuclear verification gap, IRGC asymmetric capability status (intact stockpiles and shooters vs. degraded sensors and C2), South Pars petrochemical recovery timeline tied to waiver market access, insurance and P&I restoration signals at ~8x pre-crisis war risk, vessel-backlog processing for the ~840 stranded tankers, and full-war repricing on resumption odds now assessed at 18-24%.