Country Brief: Israel

Energy Profile

Metric	Value
Oil consumption	~220K bbl/day (2024 avg)
Domestic oil production	~24K bbl/day (negligible; ~11% of consumption)
Oil import dependency	~89% of consumption met by imports
Primary crude suppliers	Azerbaijan (SOCAR), Kazakhstan, Kurdistan Region, West Africa
Refining capacity (pre-crisis)	~300K bbl/day combined (Haifa 197K + Ashdod 110K)
Natural gas production	~27 Bcm/year (Leviathan ~11 Bcm + Tamar ~10 Bcm + Karish ~6 Bcm; 2024)
Gas export markets	Egypt (via EMG pipeline + Nitzana pipeline), Jordan (via Arab Gas Pipeline spur)
Proven gas reserves	~32 Tcf (Leviathan 22 Tcf + Tamar ~10 Tcf)
Strategic petroleum reserves	~90 days of consumption (IEA-compliant)
Leviathan expansion FID	$2.36B (Jan 2026; Chevron-led; capacity 12 Bcm → 21 Bcm/year)

Key Infrastructure

Leviathan Gas Platform: Israel’s largest gas asset; operated by Chevron (39.66%) with NewMed/Delek (45.34%) and Ratio Energies (15%); current capacity ~1.2 Bcf/day; third gathering pipeline completed Mar 2026; expansion to 2.1 Bcf/day underway. Platform located ~130 km offshore, exposed to long-range missile/drone threat
Tamar Gas Platform: Second major offshore gas field; capacity expanded to ~1.2-1.6 Bcf/day (2025 expansion); operated by Chevron; supplies domestic market and Egyptian exports
Haifa Refinery (BAZAN Group): Israel’s largest refinery at 197K bbl/day; located in Haifa Bay. Struck by IRGC Kheibarshekan missiles (Mar 8, 2026); power plant damaged, 3 employees killed; remained shut through the campaign and into the Day 94 ceasefire period
Ashdod Refinery: 110K bbl/day capacity; southern coastal city; ceased operations during the conflict due to Iranian attacks and remains offline
EAPC Trans-Israel Pipeline (Eilat-Ashkelon): 254 km, 42-inch pipeline; capacity 400K bbl/day (Ashkelon to Eilat) / 1.2M bbl/day (reverse); historically transported Iranian oil (1968-1979); used for Russian and Emirati oil transit (2003-present); operational status uncertain during conflict
Israel Natural Gas Lines (INGL): National gas transmission grid; connects offshore platforms to domestic consumers and export pipelines to Egypt/Jordan; Nitzana pipeline to Egypt under construction (65 km, +6 Bcm/year capacity)
Ashkelon and Hadera Power Stations: Major gas-fired power plants dependent on Leviathan/Tamar supply; represent critical nodes in Israel’s electricity grid

Key Actors

Israel Defense Forces (IDF): Co-belligerent in Operation Epic Fury, which formally concluded May 5. Over the campaign the IDF struck 3 Tehran airports, the South Pars petrochemical complex, and ~10 railway segments/bridges across Iran. Iran-front ceasefire holds in name since Apr 8 (extended indefinitely Apr 21) but is fragile and repeatedly violated. The Lebanon track is the IDF’s active concern: a Lebanon ceasefire was agreed Apr 17, but Netanyahu has vowed to intensify strikes against Hezbollah, and the Lebanon front is the likeliest trigger for a broader collapse. During the war the IDF held territory south of the Litani; David’s Sling malfunction during the campaign allowed 2 Iranian BMs through (92% interception rate on 400+ BMs)
PM Netanyahu: Backed the Iran-front ceasefire but opposes ending the Lebanon war and has vowed to intensify strikes on Hezbollah despite the Apr 17 Lebanon ceasefire. Security chiefs do not believe the diplomatic track eliminates Iran’s nuclear/missile threat. With the US-Iran 60-day MoU tentatively reached May 28 but unsigned, and Trump adding fresh demands May 29-30, Netanyahu retains a free hand to act on immediate threats.
UN Ambassador Danon: Israel is not a party to the US-Iran talks and reserves the right to act on immediate threats. Military operations continue against threats Israel judges unresolved by any deal.
Chevron Mediterranean Ltd.: Operator of Leviathan and Tamar gas fields; suspended Leviathan expansion work during Oct 2024 escalation; resumed and completed third gathering pipeline by Mar 2026; holds FID for $2.36B Phase 1B expansion
NewMed Energy (Delek Group): Largest shareholder in Leviathan (45.34%); Israeli-listed; key domestic gas stakeholder
BAZAN Group (formerly Oil Refineries Ltd.): Operates Haifa refinery complex; refinery shut down after IRGC missile strike (Mar 8); 3 employees killed
EAPC (Europe Asia Pipeline Company): State-owned; operates Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline and oil storage; historically secretive operations; signed UAE oil transit agreement (Sep 2020)
Ministry of Energy: Oversees gas export policy, strategic reserves, emergency allocation; managing crisis response to refinery shutdowns
Mossad: Intelligence operations relevant to Iranian threat assessment and conflict trajectory

Crisis Exposure (Day 94 - Epic Fury Concluded May 5; Ceasefire Indefinite but Fragile; Lebanon the Crux)

Casualties: ~51 killed (23 military / 28 civilian), ~8,646 wounded (up from ~26 killed / ~7,183 wounded at Day 40). The bulk accrued before the May 5 conclusion of Epic Fury, during sustained Iranian BM and cluster munition attacks on residential areas.
Ceasefire status: The Iran-front ceasefire that began Apr 8 was extended indefinitely Apr 21, but it is fragile and has been repeatedly violated through late May (US strikes on Iran answered by Iranian BMs, including a late-May Iranian salvo on Kuwait). A US-Iran 60-day extension MoU was tentatively reached May 28 but is unsigned by both sides; Trump added fresh demands May 29-30 that landed badly in Tehran.
Lebanon is the Israel-specific crux: a Lebanon ceasefire was agreed Apr 17, but Netanyahu has vowed to intensify strikes on Hezbollah and Israel opposes ending the Lebanon war. The Lebanon track is the most fragile front and the likeliest trigger for a broader collapse. Lebanon cumulative toll ~3,412+ killed, ~10,269+ wounded.
Israel is not a party to the US-Iran talks (per Ambassador Danon) and reserves the right to act on immediate threats. With the MoU unsigned, the risk of unilateral Israeli action against Iranian nuclear/missile assets or in Lebanon remains a live destabilizer.
David’s Sling malfunction during the campaign allowed 2 Iranian BMs through (92% interception rate on 400+ BMs). Iranian cluster munitions repeatedly hit residential areas (Bnei Brak, Tel Aviv, Rosh HaAyin, Petah Tikva, Kiryat Ata, Haifa); HRW condemned the use as unlawful. If the ceasefire collapses, Iran has demonstrated the ability to hit residential targets at scale.
Iran nuclear program heavily struck; IAEA access refused. Iran has refused inspections of damaged facilities, leaving the program’s residual state opaque. Succession in Tehran is contested and unclear.
Both Israeli refineries (Haifa and Ashdod, combined 300K bbl/day) remain shut after Iranian missile strikes; Israel has had zero domestic refining capacity since Mar 8 and there is no confirmed restart at Day 94
Oil imports run via Mediterranean tanker deliveries (not Hormuz-dependent), but refinery shutdowns mean imported crude still cannot be processed domestically
Israel continues to import refined products (gasoline, diesel, jet fuel) rather than crude, competing for scarce refined products even as Brent has deflated to ~$91 from the early-April peak
Offshore gas platforms (Leviathan, Tamar) have stayed operational throughout and continue to supply the domestic market and exports to Egypt and Jordan; they face residual threat from Hezbollah given the fragile Lebanon track, and any strike on platform infrastructure would collapse domestic gas supply and electricity generation
Gas exports to Egypt and Jordan continued through the conflict but remain hostage to the Lebanon track; disruption would cascade to Egyptian power generation and Jordanian energy supply
Leviathan $2.36B expansion timeline remains uncertain pending a durable settlement
EAPC pipeline (Eilat-Ashkelon) operational status remains uncertain under the fragile ceasefire
Strategic petroleum reserves (~90 days) provide a buffer, but without functioning refineries, crude reserves have limited utility

Structural Vulnerabilities

Zero refining capacity since Mar 8; both refineries shut down. Israel is entirely dependent on refined product imports until repairs are completed and a restart is confirmed
Lebanon is the most fragile front: a ceasefire was agreed Apr 17, but Netanyahu has vowed to intensify strikes on Hezbollah and Israel opposes ending the Lebanon war. This is the likeliest trigger for a broader collapse of the whole ceasefire architecture
David’s Sling interception gap exposed: 92% rate on 400+ BMs, but 2 penetrated. If the ceasefire collapses, Iran has demonstrated the ability to hit residential targets repeatedly with cluster munitions
~8,646 wounded represents a significant medical system burden and long-term care costs
Offshore gas platforms are concentrated, high-value targets. Leviathan and Tamar represent ~100% of domestic gas production; a successful strike would be catastrophic for electricity generation. Residual Hezbollah threat to platforms persists given the fragile Lebanon track
No domestic oil production of significance (~24K bbl/day vs. ~220K consumption); near-total import dependency for liquid fuels
Small geographic size means all energy infrastructure is within Iranian ballistic missile range (~1,200 km Shahab-3 / Kheibarshekan). The indefinite ceasefire provides only a conditional reprieve while the MoU sits unsigned
Eastern Mediterranean gas export market disruption risk. Egypt’s Idku and Damietta LNG plants partially depend on Israeli gas feedstock via the EMG pipeline; a renewed war would threaten this supply chain
EAPC pipeline carries legacy legal risk: Iran claims $1.1B compensation (2015 Swiss court ruling), and the pipeline’s strategic value as a Suez bypass is politically sensitive
Military operations consume significant fuel. Any resumption of IDF air operations or intensified Lebanon strikes would require jet fuel imports during a period of global refined product scarcity
Israel not party to negotiations: Ambassador Danon confirmed Israel is not part of the US-Iran talks and reserves the right to act on immediate threats. Security chiefs do not believe a deal eliminates the nuclear/missile threat. Risk of unilateral Israeli action undermining the unsigned MoU framework

TankerBrief Coverage Angle

Defense analysts, energy trading desks, Eastern Mediterranean gas investors, and insurance underwriters assessing Israeli infrastructure risk. At Day 94 they need: the Lebanon track as the primary collapse trigger (ceasefire Apr 17, but Netanyahu vows to intensify) and residual Hezbollah threat to offshore platforms; whether Israel acts unilaterally given it is not party to the unsigned US-Iran 60-day MoU; refinery repair and restart timelines (Haifa BAZAN, Ashdod, both still offline); offshore gas platform operational status (Leviathan/Tamar have kept running); continuity of Israeli gas exports to Egypt and Jordan; refined product import requirements as Brent deflates to ~$91; David’s Sling interception gap analysis; ceasefire durability after repeated violations through late May; casualty trajectory (~51 KIA, ~8,646 WIA); and strategic reserve drawdown tracking.