Country Brief: Pakistan

Energy Profile

Metric	Value
Crude oil consumption	~550K bbl/day
Crude oil imports	~470K bbl/day (~85% import-dependent)
Domestic production	~80K bbl/day
Hormuz-dependent imports	~85% of crude + 99% of LNG from Qatar/UAE via Hormuz
Strategic reserves (SPR)	None - no formal SPR program
Refining capacity	~450K bbl/day (5 major refineries; low complexity)
LNG imports	~7.5-8 MTPA (up to ~10 MTPA terminal capacity); 99% from Qatar/UAE via Hormuz
Natural gas domestic production	~3.5 Bcf/day (declining fields)

Reserve Status (Disputed)

Product	Govt (OGRA)	Industry (PPDA)
Petrol	26 days	14 days
Diesel	25 days	14 days
Crude (refineries)	~10 days	-
LPG	~15 days	-
LNG	Critical - 99% from Qatar/UAE via Hormuz	-

Note: Government (OGRA) and industry (PPDA) reserve estimates diverge by nearly 2x on petrol and diesel. OGRA figures likely include pipeline fill and in-transit stocks; PPDA counts only usable terminal/depot inventory. Actual days-of-cover likely closer to PPDA estimates under crisis draw rates.

Key Infrastructure

Pak-Arab Refinery (PARCO), Mahmood Kot: 120K bbl/day, largest refinery; mid-country location
Pakistan Refinery Ltd (PRL), Karachi: 47K bbl/day; coastal refinery near Keamari port
National Refinery Ltd (NRL), Karachi: 65K bbl/day, processes domestic and imported crude
Attock Refinery Ltd (ARL), Rawalpindi: 43K bbl/day; processes domestic crude from Potwar basin
Port Qasim LNG Terminal (EETPL): 600 mmcfd regasification capacity. Primary LNG import facility
Engro Elengy LNG Terminal, Port Qasim: 600 mmcfd, second FSRU-based terminal
Karachi/Keamari Ports: Primary crude oil import terminals; handle ~90% of seaborne energy imports
Gwadar Port: Deep-water port; no oil/LNG terminal infrastructure operational (CPEC plans shelved)

Key Actors

PM Shehbaz Sharif: declared energy emergency (Mar 9); ran wartime austerity through April; co-broker of the Apr 7-8 ceasefire cited by Trump by name; thanked by Iran FM Araghchi for “tireless efforts”; host of the Islamabad Talks (Apr 11-12)
Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir: keeps a direct line to President Trump; the central back-channel actor with credibility in both Washington and Tehran; co-broker of the Apr 7-8 ceasefire cited by Trump by name; has shuttled to Tehran; one of the leaders Trump phoned in the May 23 round of deal calls
OGRA (Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority): sets fuel prices; publishes reserve data (disputed by industry)
PPDA (Pakistan Petroleum Dealers Association): industry body; publishes alternative reserve estimates
PARCO (Pak-Arab Refinery Co.): joint Pakistan-UAE venture; largest refinery; leading emergency procurement
PSO (Pakistan State Oil): state-owned fuel distributor; launched emergency non-Hormuz tenders
PNSC (Pakistan National Shipping Corporation): state shipping line; MT Karachi stranded near Strait
Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Division): policy coordination, emergency response

Crisis Exposure (Hormuz Crisis, Day 94)

85% of crude and 99% of LNG imports transit Hormuz; near-total exposure. The strait is open on paper but functionally choked: open transits have been near zero since ~May 6, mines from the war are still uncleared, and insurance/P&I cover has not been restored
The crisis began with Operation Epic Fury (Feb 28) and the air campaign formally concluded May 5. A ceasefire has held since Apr 8, extended indefinitely Apr 21, but it is fragile and has been repeatedly violated (US strikes Apr 19, May 7, May 25, plus late-May “defensive strikes” in southern Iran answered by Iranian missiles on Kuwait)
A 60-day US-Iran MoU was tentatively reached May 28 but is still UNSIGNED: Hormuz reopens with no tolls and Iran clears its mines within ~30 days; the US lifts its port blockade and grants some sanctions waivers; plus Iranian nuclear commitments. Trump added new demands May 29-30 that landed badly in Tehran
~600 tankers are stranded inside the Gulf with ~240 more waiting outside (per the May 11 count); Pakistan’s earlier stranded crude tankers (incl. PNSC’s MT Karachi) sit inside this backlog
LNG supply effectively severed for the duration; both Port Qasim terminals have run with zero or near-zero cargoes since the closure
PM Shehbaz’s 14-point austerity plan (declared Mar 9-10) carried Pakistan through the war: school closures, a 4-day government work week, 50% work-from-home, cabinet salary cuts, 60% of government vehicles off the road, weekly fuel price revisions. Most measures were rolled back through April-May as oil fell, but the fiscal damage is locked in
Petrol peaked at Rs 321.17/litre (+21% on the Mar single largest increase in Pakistan’s history); the May oil slide (Brent off ~19%) has since pulled pump prices back off the wartime peak
Pakistan Day parade cancelled (Mar 23) during the worst of the crisis
Pakistan Navy ran “Operation Muhafiz-ul-Bahr” (from Mar 9) escorting Pakistani merchant vessels with 8 warships: 4 Tughril-class (Type 054A/P, Chinese-built) frigates + 4 Yarmook-class OPVs. The first non-Western independent escort operation of the crisis
PARCO procured 140,000 barrels via alternate routes (70K from UAE/Fujairah, 70K from Saudi/Yanbu); PSO ran emergency non-Hormuz tenders; Iranian crude imports suspended; ~350 mmcfd of domestic gas restored from marginal fields
Pakistani nationals killed by Iranian missile debris in Abu Dhabi (Mar 27-28): at least 2 confirmed
Brent ~$91/bbl (down from the ~$115 WTI war peak on Apr 7), after a ~19% drop across May on ceasefire-extension and reopening hopes; the import-bill relief is real but reverses instantly if the MoU collapses and the strait stays shut

Lead Mediator of the Crisis (Mar 23 - Jun 1, Day 94)

Pakistan is the central diplomatic actor of the entire Hormuz crisis. It brokered the first ceasefire, hosted the highest-level US-Iran meeting since 1979, and still holds the key back-channel into the unsigned MoU. A country that entered the war as one of its most exposed energy victims has come out as the indispensable intermediary.

The Ceasefire and the Islamabad Talks (Apr 7-12)

TWO-WEEK CEASEFIRE (Apr 7-8): Trump announced it citing PM Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir by name: “Based on conversations with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir, of Pakistan…” Iran’s FM Araghchi thanked both for their “tireless efforts.” The ceasefire began Apr 8
ISLAMABAD TALKS (Apr 11-12): Pakistan hosted the highest-level US-Iran meeting since 1979. The US side (Vance, Witkoff, Kushner) sat across from Iran (Araghchi, Ghalibaf). After ~21 hours, Vance announced no agreement and the talks collapsed. The venue itself was the achievement: Pakistan put the two sides in one room for the first time in 47 years
Dual blockade hardened (Apr 13): after the talks failed, the US imposed a naval blockade of Iranian ports on top of Iran’s chokehold on the Gulf
Ceasefire extended indefinitely (Apr 21), though it has been violated repeatedly since

The Endgame and Pakistan’s Continuing Role (Apr 21 - Jun 1)

Pakistan remains a lead mediator alongside Qatar (the Doha track), with Egypt, Turkey, and Oman in support. The negotiation has two centers of gravity: Islamabad/Munir and Doha
Munir was among the leaders Trump phoned on May 23 when he said the Hormuz-reopening deal was “largely negotiated” (the same round included Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and Netanyahu)
60-day MoU tentatively reached May 28, still unsigned: Hormuz reopens with no tolls and Iran clears its mines within ~30 days; the US lifts the port blockade and grants sanctions waivers; plus Iranian nuclear commitments. Trump added fresh demands May 29-30 (no enrichment, asset unfreezing) that went down badly in Tehran. Doha talks are described as “generally positive” but the document is signed by neither side
Earlier wins that built the channel: the 20-ship Hormuz deal (Mar 28-29, FM Dar announced Iran would pass 20 Pakistani-flagged vessels at 2/day), the routing of the US 15-point plan through Islamabad (Mar 25), and the Four-Nation Islamabad meeting (Mar 29, FMs of Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, relocated from Ankara because Pakistan had become the center of gravity)

Strategic Assessment

Pakistan delivered what no other mediator could: it got both sides into one room (Apr 11-12) and brokered the only ceasefire that has held, however loosely, since Apr 8. Army Chief Munir’s direct line to Trump, paired with Pakistan’s cultural and religious ties to Tehran, gives it a dual-access channel no other state holds. That channel is the reason Munir is still on Trump’s call list as the MoU is finalized. The risk runs the other way too: if the unsigned deal collapses and fighting resumes, the mediator’s stature deflates with it, and Pakistan is left holding the same energy exposure it started with. For now this is Pakistan’s most visible diplomatic achievement in decades. The paradox is sharp: the crisis raised Pakistan’s standing precisely because Pakistan was so exposed to it that it could not afford to let it run.

LNG Terminal Status & Gas Sector Impact

Both FSRU-based LNG terminals at Port Qasim have sat idle since the Hormuz closure; with open transits near zero since ~May 6, cargo flow has not resumed even under the ceasefire
Pakistan LNG Ltd (PLL) has no spot purchase options; long-term Qatar contracts remain under force majeure as the strait stays choked
Gas shortfall of ~1.0-1.5 Bcf/day has materialized as LNG stockpiles drew down
Fertilizer sector: Agritech Fertilizer shut down on LNG force majeure; other urea plants at risk
Power sector: ~30% of electricity generation is gas-fired; load-shedding to increase sharply
CNG stations (transport fuel for millions) facing closure as piped gas reallocated to power/fertilizer

Economic Impact

Monthly oil import bill eased with Brent ~$91 (off ~19% in May) versus the ~$115 war peak; the relief is real but reverses the moment the MoU fails and the strait stays shut
Every $10/bbl oil price move is worth ~$1.5-2B on the annual current account, so the May slide is a meaningful tailwind for the IMF account
Trade deficit ran up ~25% to ~$25B (Jul-Feb FY26) before the May price relief
Inflation pressure from wartime fuel pass-through is now cooling with the oil crash; the spike risk is the unsigned MoU, not the current price
Textile sector absorbed a 25-30% freight cost surge during the closure; freight has not normalized while insurance/P&I cover is still off
PKR under pressure through the war; the central bank spent reserves defending the currency, and the May oil relief takes some of that load off
Pakistan’s elevated mediator standing is its clearest upside: a stronger hand in Gulf bilateral energy deals and in the IMF program, provided the diplomacy does not unravel

Structural Vulnerabilities

85% import-dependent on Gulf crude with no diversification
99% of LNG from Qatar/UAE, a single-chokepoint dependency
No strategic petroleum reserve (no proper SPR program)
Limited refining capacity (~450K bbl/day) with low complexity; cannot process heavy/sour grades efficiently
No pipeline bypass infrastructure. Gwadar-Kashgar oil pipeline (CPEC) shelved; IP gas pipeline from Iran incomplete
CPEC energy portfolio is power plants, not oil/gas supply; China offers no supply lifeline
Declining domestic gas production (~3.5 Bcf/day) with no major new discoveries
Fiscal fragility: IMF program constraints limit government’s ability to subsidize fuel prices

TankerBrief Coverage Angle

South Asia energy desks, IMF/World Bank policy watchers, LNG traders (Qatar long-term contract holders), shipping companies on Karachi routes, fertilizer/agriculture commodity analysts, and diplomatic/political-risk desks tracking the Hormuz endgame. At Day 94 the dual story is mediation and exposure. They need: where the unsigned 60-day MoU stands and Pakistan’s role in it (the Munir-Trump channel, the Doha track), Port Qasim LNG terminal status as the strait stays choked, reserve drawdown (OGRA vs PPDA figures), the path of the oil import bill as Brent sits ~$91, IMF program positioning after the May price relief, and what Pakistan can extract from Gulf states on the back of its raised standing.