SCENARIO PROBABILITIES Updated: Jul 1, 2026
Probabilities reflect the gap between declaratory IRGC threat language and observable behavior as of July 1 morning. No Hormuz-specific action has followed the Lebanon flare-up; deal-collapse probability from the July 1 SITREP (35-45%) is treated as the pre-Lebanon base rate, adjusted here for the added tail risk this report models.
Fuse Doesn't Connect 38%
Israel absorbs Jun 30 strikes; IRGC stays silent on Hormuz $70-75
Contained Flare 27%
Lebanon-scoped Israeli response; IRGC cites the clause rhetorically only $73-76
Katz Trigger Fires 20%
Israel strikes an Iran-linked target; IRGC names Hormuz explicitly $80-87
Diplomatic Circuit Breaker 10%
US/Qatar broker a Hezbollah-Israel truce within 72 hours $68-71
Hardliner Unilateral Invocation 5%
IRGC suspends Hormuz cooperation for domestic reasons, independent of Beirut $78-82

Hezbollah declared its ceasefire with Israel void on June 30, then launched the heaviest barrage of the post-ceasefire period: a missile aimed at Ashdod Naval Base, rocket fire into northern Israel, and one confirmed fatality. That is a Lebanon story. It became a Hormuz story the moment the IRGC repeated a sentence it first issued June 29: any ceasefire violation suspends all related processes. Nobody in Tehran has said the word Hormuz in connection with Beirut. Nobody has to. The ambiguity is the point. Today's brief covers Wednesday's toll booth rejection and the mine clearance clock; this report models what happens if Iran's hardliners decide those two sentences are the same sentence.