Country Brief: Bangladesh
Energy Profile
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Crude oil consumption | ~130K bbl/day |
| Crude oil imports | ~120K bbl/day (~95% import-dependent for petroleum) |
| Domestic oil production | ~7K bbl/day (negligible) |
| Refining capacity | ~36K bbl/day (ERL Chittagong 33K + Mongla 2.5K) |
| Natural gas domestic production | ~1,850 mmcfd (mid-2025; declining from ~2,700 mmcfd peak) |
| LNG imports | ~3.5-7.5 MTPA (scaling up; 109 cargoes in 2025, ~115 projected 2026) |
| Hormuz-dependent LNG | ~50-72% of LNG from Qatar/UAE transits Hormuz |
| Power generation from gas | ~39% of electricity mix (down from 90%+ a decade ago) |
| Installed generation capacity | ~28,000 MW |
| Population | ~175M |
Reserve Status
| Product | Estimated Cover |
|---|---|
| Diesel | ~158,900 MT (~13 days) |
| Furnace oil | ~67,500 MT (~45 days) |
| Jet fuel | ~60,700 MT (~42 days) |
| Octane | ~26,250 MT (~25 days) |
| Petrol | ~20,600 MT (~17 days) |
| Kerosene | ~14,070 MT (~71 days) |
| LNG | Critical: zero cargoes arriving since Hormuz closure |
| Strategic petroleum reserve | None. No formal SPR program |
Note: Fuel reserve figures per BPC (Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation) as of early March 2026. Unlike Pakistan, Bangladesh imports most refined products directly (from Singapore, China, Malaysia, Indonesia) rather than refining domestically, giving partial insulation on liquid fuels but total exposure on LNG.
Key Infrastructure
- Moheshkhali FSRU Terminal 1 (Summit LNG): 500 mmcfd regasification. Primary LNG import facility, ship-to-ship transfers off Moheshkhali Island, Bay of Bengal
- Moheshkhali FSRU Terminal 2 (Excellence/Excelerate): 500 mmcfd regasification, second FSRU; combined capacity 1,000-1,100 mmcfd
- Eastern Refinery Ltd (ERL), Chittagong: 33K bbl/day, Bangladesh’s only significant refinery; processes imported crude from UAE/Saudi Arabia
- Chittagong Port: Primary seaborne energy import terminal; handles ~90% of fuel imports
- Payra Port: Seaport (downgraded from deep-sea port); planned FSRU terminal scrapped (Nov 2025)
- Domestic gas fields: Bibiyana (~1,200 mmcfd, Chevron-operated), Titas (~400 mmcfd, BGFCL); both depleting; Bibiyana reserves ~1.66 Tcf remaining, Titas ~2 Tcf
- India cross-border diesel pipeline: Parbatipur entry point; 180,000 tonnes/year agreement with India
Key Actors
- Petrobangla: state oil, gas, and mineral corporation; parent of all upstream/midstream entities
- BPC (Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation): state fuel importer and distributor; manages refined product reserves
- RPGCL (Rupantarita Prakritik Gas Company Ltd): Petrobangla subsidiary; manages LNG terminal operations and CNG distribution
- GTCL (Gas Transmission Company Ltd): national gas transmission pipeline operator
- Titas Gas (TGTDCL): largest gas distributor (~60% of national supply); serves Dhaka and Mymensingh
- Karnaphuli Gas (KGDCL): gas distributor for Chittagong region
- BPDB (Bangladesh Power Development Board): state power generation and distribution authority
- Chevron Bangladesh: operates Bibiyana, Jalalabad, and Moulvibazar fields; largest gas producer in-country
Crisis Exposure (Hormuz Crisis, Day 94)
- QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan force majeure (declared Mar 2) has shaped the entire crisis. Bangladesh’s anchor LNG supplier stayed offline through the active war, which ended May 5, forcing Petrobangla onto the spot market for most of its gas
- Spot LNG has been the story. March spot purchases ran as high as ~$24-28/MMBtu (vs ~$10 on Mar 1); by May the average had settled near ~$21/MMBtu, still about double the pre-crisis level
- Petrobangla reversed a plan to cut May imports to nine cargoes and instead booked 11 LNG cargoes for May to hold gas to power plants ahead of peak summer demand (electricity demand near ~17,000 MW). Even 11 cargoes deliver ~935 mmcfd to power, against ~2,525 mmcfd of power-sector gas demand. The gap is structural, not transient
- Government has sought ~$1 billion-plus to cover April to June LNG imports and flagged a need for ~$3 billion in extra fuel-import financing by June; it expects ~$1.5 billion of IMF support toward the energy gap
- Earlier crisis-phase rationing (10% cut to filling-station allocations, vehicle-category purchase limits, ~25% octane supply reduction) has eased as Brent deflated, but BPC procurement costs remain elevated and FX-constrained
- India cross-border diesel via the Parbatipur pipeline (180,000 tonnes/year agreement) and refined-product sourcing from Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia remain the liquid-fuel backstop. Liquid fuels were never the binding constraint. LNG and gas-fired power were
- Brent ~$91/bbl on June 1, down ~19% across May (its worst month since 2020) on ceasefire-extension and Hormuz-reopening hopes. This is the single biggest relief for Bangladesh: lower crude and refined-product costs slow FX reserve erosion and ease the BPC import bill
- Ceasefire indefinite since Apr 21 but fragile and repeatedly violated. A 60-day extension MoU was tentatively reached May 28 (Hormuz reopens with no tolls, Iran clears mines within 30 days; US lifts its port blockade and issues sanctions waivers; nuclear commitments) but remains UNSIGNED, with Trump adding demands May 29-30
- Hormuz is open on paper, choked in practice. Open transits have been near zero since ~May 6, mines are still uncleared, and Iran has been charging tolls reported above $1M per ship. ~600 tankers are stranded inside the Gulf and ~240 waiting outside. LNG carriers serving Qatar/UAE routes face the same wall, so the practical supply path for Bangladesh’s Hormuz-sourced LNG is not yet restored
Garment Sector Vulnerability
- Ready-made garments (RMG) account for ~$39B in annual exports (FY2024-25), representing 81.5% of total export earnings
- Sector employs ~4M workers directly, ~40M in extended supply chain
- Continuous-dyeing lines and textile finishing require uninterrupted power; load-shedding causes defect spikes and late shipment penalties
- Rolling blackouts of 1,500-2,000 MW daily shortfall already disrupting production before crisis
- Extended power rationing threatens order fulfilment for Western buyers (H&M, Zara, Primark, Walmart) during peak spring/summer season
- Comparison with Pakistan: Pakistan’s textile sector (~$15B exports, ~25-30% of export earnings) faces similar freight cost surges; Bangladesh’s RMG concentration is far higher (81.5% vs. ~55% for Pakistan’s textiles as share of exports), making energy disruption an existential economic threat
Structural Vulnerabilities
- Near-total LNG import dependency for gas-fired power generation; domestic production in terminal decline (~1,850 mmcfd vs. ~2,700 mmcfd peak)
- 175M population on a fragile, overloaded grid. Demand regularly exceeds supply by 1,500-2,000 MW even pre-crisis
- Single-chokepoint LNG exposure: 50-72% of LNG supply transits Hormuz (Qatar/UAE sourcing)
- No strategic petroleum reserve. No SPR program exists or is planned
- Minimal refining capacity (36K bbl/day); imports ~95% of refined petroleum products
- Garment exports (81.5% of export earnings) critically dependent on stable electricity for textile finishing and dyeing
- Limited fiscal space: forex reserves ~$29B (IMF BPM6 basis, early 2026; gross reserves higher) covering ~5 months of imports; energy price spikes directly erode import cover, and Dhaka has sought ~$1.5B in IMF support plus ~$3B in extra fuel-import financing to plug the crisis-driven gap
- Payra FSRU terminal deal scrapped (Nov 2025); third LNG terminal indefinitely delayed
- Proven gas reserves approaching depletion: Bibiyana ~1.66 Tcf, Titas ~2 Tcf remaining; no major new discoveries
- Worse positioned than Pakistan on LNG: Pakistan has two LNG terminals at Port Qasim plus declining but larger domestic gas production (~3,500 mmcfd vs. Bangladesh’s ~1,850 mmcfd); Bangladesh has no pipeline gas alternative (Iran-Pakistan pipeline does not extend to Bangladesh)
Ceasefire and MoU Implications (Day 94)
The active war concluded May 5 and the ceasefire has held since Apr 21 in name, but it has been violated repeatedly (US strikes Apr 19, May 7, May 25, plus late-May “defensive strikes” answered by Iranian missiles on Kuwait). For Bangladesh the picture is a clear split: price pressure has relaxed, but the physical supply path and FX fragility have not.
- Oil price relief is real: Brent at ~$91 (down ~19% in May from the early-April war peak) cuts refined-product import costs, eases BPC’s procurement burden, and slows forex reserve erosion. This is the tangible win for an Import-Vulnerable economy
- LNG supply path still blocked: the strait is “open” on paper but transits have been near zero since ~May 6, mines are uncleared, and Iran has charged tolls reported above $1M per ship. Qatar’s Ras Laffan force majeure further limited term supply for much of the crisis, so Bangladesh’s Hormuz-routed LNG cannot yet flow normally regardless of the truce
- The MoU would help but is unsigned: the tentative May 28 deal has Hormuz reopening with no tolls and Iran clearing mines within 30 days, in exchange for the US lifting its port blockade and issuing sanctions waivers. If signed and honored, that timeline points to LNG carrier traffic normalizing through July. Trump’s added demands (May 29-30) and Tehran’s contested succession leave that far from settled
- Insurance framing, corrected: the binding constraint for carriers was never a wholesale collapse of cover. Poolable P&I and blue-card cover stayed in force and reinsured in London. What lapsed were the non-poolable charterers’ war-risk extensions, and war-risk premiums multiplied to ~1.5-3% of hull (up to ~5% for US/UK/Israel-linked ships), spiking higher only at the late-March peak. With mines still in the water, premiums and the withdrawn charterers’ extensions keep LNG operators cautious about Hormuz transits even under the ceasefire
- Spot LNG cost, not availability, is now the squeeze: Petrobangla is paying ~$21/MMBtu on the spot market and booked 11 cargoes for May to hold power-sector gas through peak summer demand. The volume gap (~935 mmcfd delivered vs ~2,525 mmcfd demanded for power) means load management continues even as it buys what it can
- FX and IMF exposure: the crisis has forced Dhaka to seek ~$1.5B in IMF support and ~$3B in extra fuel-import financing by June. With Brent easing the acute pressure relaxes, but a renewed price spike if the ceasefire fails would land directly on ~$29B of reserves and ~5 months of import cover
TankerBrief Coverage Angle
South Asia energy desks, LNG spot market traders, garment industry supply chain analysts, shipping companies on Bay of Bengal routes, and development finance institutions (World Bank, ADB, IMF) tracking Bangladesh’s macro stability. On Day 94 the question has shifted from “will the grid collapse” to “how much does it cost to hold the line, and for how long.” They need: monthly LNG cargo bookings and spot prices paid (Petrobangla is at ~$21/MMBtu and booked 11 cargoes for May), Moheshkhali FSRU throughput, the gap between gas delivered to power (~935 mmcfd) and power-sector demand (~2,525 mmcfd), BPC import-bill trajectory as Brent eases to $91, forex reserve cover ($29B, 5 months) and the size of the IMF top-up and fuel-financing ask ($1.5B + ~$3B), garment-sector load management through peak summer, and Hormuz transit reality (near-zero open transits, mines uncleared) versus the unsigned 60-day MoU. The single metric that matters: whether the MoU is signed and mines cleared on the ~30-day timeline, which is what would let Hormuz-routed LNG and cheaper crude reach Chittagong in volume. Until then Bangladesh pays a premium to keep the lights on, and a ceasefire failure that re-spikes Brent and spot LNG would hit reserves and the IMF program directly.